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Computerized Takedowns: A Balanced 
Approach to Protect Fair Uses and the 
Rights of Copyright Owners 
 
Steven M. Davis* 
INTRODUCTION 
Natalie is a young filmmaker who posts videos on YouTube 
that document the life of musicians.1 To that  end,  Natalie 
receives revenue from advertisements that run before or during 
her video. The more views her videos get, the more revenue she 
receives.  In Natalie’s videos, she uses photos and video clips of  
the musicians she documents. As a savvy entrepreneur, she gives 
her videos a title based on the musician’s most popular song. 
Natalie chooses those types of titles for her videos because she 
knows that more people are likely to see her video if the title 
resembles a popular song. 
Natalie’s videos received hundreds of thousands of views. 
However, Natalie began to notice that some of her videos were 
being removed, and she wondered why. She contacted YouTube, 
and, through several emails, learned that YouTube was removing 
her videos because a copyright enforcement agency sent 
“takedown notices”2 to YouTube claiming that Natalie was 
infringing on the musicians’ copyrights. 
After YouTube notified Natalie that her videos were removed, 
 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger  Williams  University  School  of  
Law, 2018; B.A., University of Rhode Island, 2014. Thanks to Greg 
Henninger and Professor Niki Kuckes for their help and unique insight  
during the writing process. 
1. The following scenario is based on a hypothetical. 
2. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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she sent a “counter notice”3 to inform YouTube that she wanted 
the videos reposted. However, due to a statutory mandate, 
YouTube must wait a minimum of ten days to put Natalie’s videos 
back.4 During the required ten-day waiting period, Natalie lost 
thousands of dollars as a result of lost advertising. Further, for 
Natalie to redress this wrong, she must now endure an onerous 
lawsuit against the multi-million dollar company claiming it owns 
the copyright in her videos. This example, and many more,  
happen due to the notice-and-takedown scheme under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512.5 
That takedown statute creates a tension between copyright 
owners and Internet users. Because of the takedown statute, 
copyright owners can remove infringing material from the 
Internet without filing a lawsuit.6 Additionally, the takedown 
provision shields service providers7 from liability when users post 
infringing material on its website.8 However, the rise of user- 
generated content has created a tension between copyright 
owners’ need to swiftly remove infringing material and users’ 
ability to post creative, non-infringing fair uses of, otherwise 
protected, copyrighted material. 
In 2016, this tension was enhanced with the Ninth Circuit 
Court’s ruling in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.9 In Lenz, the 
Ninth Circuit held that “a copyright holder must consider the 
existence of fair use before sending a takedown notification.”10 
However, the court explained that a copyright owner’s fair use 
consideration need only amount to a “subjective good faith belief” 
 
3. A counter-notice allows a user, who has his or her content removed 
via takedown notice, to have their content put back by sending a notice to the 
service provider that hosted the content. See infra Part I.B. 
4. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012). 
5. See Takedown Hall of Shame, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/takedowns [https://perma.cc/JJ9F-FKXB] (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2017). 
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
7. See infra note 21. 
8. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45 (1998) (“This ‘notice and takedown’ 
procedure is a formalization and refinement of a cooperative process that has 
been employed to deal efficiently with network-based copyright 
infringement.”). 
9. See 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 416 (2016), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2263 (2017). 
10. Id. at 1153. 
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that a user’s content is not fair use.11 As a result, Lenz creates a 
problem for a considerable amount of copyright owners who, 
through authorized third parties, employ computerized methods to 
search for infringing material posted on the Internet.12 Because it 
is unclear whether a computerized method can consider fair use,13 
or form a good faith belief for the copyright owner, Lenz creates 
uncertainty for owners who use those methods.14 
This Comment argues that copyright owners who rely on 
computerized methods cannot form a good faith belief if the 
method used is unable to accurately assess fair use. To satisfy the 
holding in Lenz, copyright owners who use computerized methods 
should have to show15 that those methods, during infringement 
identification, consider the statutory fair use factors,16 or fair uses 
recognized by courts.17 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history and purpose of 
the notice-and-takedown statutory scheme while also reviewing 
the safeguards in place for users. Part II examines how courts 
have interpreted the good faith belief requirement in the 
takedown statute. Part III discusses the fair use doctrine and the 
problems that a fair use consideration may pose to copyright 
owners that use computerized methods. Part IV argues that an 
 
 
11. Id. (citing Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 
1004 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
12. Caitlin Dewey, How we’re unwittingly letting robots censor the Web, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the- 
intersect/wp/2016/03/29/how-were-unwittingly-letting-robots-censor-the-web/ 
?utm_term=.3e1e752dd23d [https://perma.cc/A7VN-CHZ3]; see also Rebecca 
Alderfer Rock, Comment, Fair Use Analysis in DMCA Takedown Notices: 
Necessary or Noxious?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 691, 702–03 (2014) (“[L]arge-scale 
holders of copyrighted materials, such as telecom companies and music 
companies, use automated processes to scan large quantities of uploaded 
material in order to search for infringing content.”). 
13. Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 
88 (U.C. Berkeley, Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 2755628, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628 (showing that 
computer algorithms erroneously identify non-infringing fair uses as 
infringing). 
14. See 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). 
15. For purposes of this Comment, this showing is required only when a 
user files a misrepresentation in a takedown notice claim. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(f). 
16. Id. § 107. 
17. See infra note 138. 
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objective standard is insufficient to meet the goals of the notice- 
and-takedown scheme. This Part also shows that, while Lenz 
provides the appropriate baseline for meeting the goals of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the notice-and-takedown 
scheme continues to disproportionately favor copyright owners. 
Part V recommends that, in response to a misrepresentation in a 
takedown notice claim, courts should place the burden on 
copyright owners to show how fair use was considered. This Part 
also contends that courts should allow copyright owners, with 
computerized methods comparable to YouTube’s Content ID 
system, to form a good faith belief through a computerized 
method, so long as that method accurately considers fair use. 
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN 
SCHEME 
Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998 (DMCA)18 “to facilitate the robust development and world- 
wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, 
development, and education in the digital age.”19 The heart of the 
DMCA is found in 17 U.S.C. § 512, which “create[s] a series of  
‘safe harbors[]’ for certain common activities of service 
providers.”20 In particular, § 512(c) provides a safe harbor for 
Online Service Providers (OSPs),21 such as YouTube, to avoid 
secondary liability when a user posts an infringing use of 
copyrighted material on an OSP’s website.22 Equally important, 
§ 512(c)(3) establishes the notice-and-takedown procedure.23 
 
18. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1332; 28 U.S.C. § 4001). 
19. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998). 
20. Id. at 19 (alterations in original). 
21. An OSP is a “provider of online services” for users. See 17 U.S.C. § 
512(k)(1)(B) (2012). For example, websites such as YouTube and Facebook are 
OSPs. In contrast, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) is “an  entity offering 
the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online 
communications.” Id. § 512(k)(1)(A). For example, internet providers, such as 
Cox Communications and Verizon, are ISPs. This Comment solely focuses on 
OSPs because safe harbor immunities involving takedown notices generally 
involve OSPs. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Deterring Abuse of the Copyright 
Takedown Regime by Taking Misrepresentation Claims Seriously, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 745, 752 (2011). 
22. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
23. Id. § 512(c)(3). 
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Yet, service providers have no incentive to investigate the 
validity of a takedown notice. To qualify for safe harbor protection 
under § 512(c), an OSP must remove or disable access to an 
alleged infringement “expeditiously.”24 In other words, OSPs have 
little autonomy in the notice-and-takedown process because failing 
to remove or disable access to an alleged infringement 
“expeditiously” may result in the loss of safe harbor protection 
and, thus, the attachment of secondary liability.25  Because  
service providers desire to avoid such liability, many OSPs have 
developed robust notice-and-takedown procedures.26 
A. The Notice-and-Takedown Process 
Copyright owners need only send a notice to a website to 
remove allegedly infringing material. Congress intended the 
notice-and-takedown procedure to provide copyright owners with a 
means to efficiently remove internet-based copyright infringement 
without going to court to file a lawsuit27 because “copyright 
owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the 
Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected 
against massive piracy.”28 
Copyright owners are responsible for monitoring and policing 
web-based copyright infringement.29 Policing copyright 
 
24. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
25. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45 (“[T]he limitation on the service provider’s 
liability shall be maintained only if the service provider acts expeditiously 
either to remove the infringing material from its system or to prevent further 
access to the infringing material on the system or network.”). 
26. See Loren, supra note 21, at 752–53 (describing the requirements 
service providers must take to maintain safe harbor protection). A service 
provider must also satisfy two additional conditions to qualify for safe harbor 
protection. First, for purposes of this Comment, when an OSP obtains 
“knowledge or awareness” that infringing material is on its system, it must 
“act[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). That condition essentially interlocks with the requirement 
that an OSP, upon receiving a takedown notice, must “respond[] 
expeditiously to remove” the claimed infringement. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
Second, an OSP must not “receive a financial benefit directly attributable to 
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity.” Id. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
27. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45. 
28. Id. at 8. 
29. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“The DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright 
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infringement is achieved solely through sending a takedown 
notice.30 To issue a valid takedown notice, the copyright owner 
must: (1) provide a signature; (2) identify the owner’s work; (3) 
identify the allegedly infringing content; (4) contain the owner’s 
contact information; (5) contain a statement that the owner has a 
good faith belief that use of the alleged infringing material is not 
authorized by the owner, its agent, or the law; and (6) contain a 
statement, under penalty of perjury, that the information in the 
takedown notice is accurate.31 The owner then sends the  
takedown notice to the OSP where the infringing material is 
located.32 Once a valid takedown notice is sent to an OSP, the  
OSP must remove the alleged infringing material to maintain safe 
harbor protection.33 
B. Safeguards for Users: Counter Notification and Section 512(f) 
Claims 
To ensure that users have a mechanism to push back against 
improperly sent takedown notices, Congress included two 
counterweights in § 512: the counter notification procedure and a 
right of action for misrepresentation in a takedown notice.34 
1. Counter Notification 
The first tool conferred on users to push back against 
improper takedowns is the counter notification procedure in 
§ 512(g)(3).35 A counter notice provides users with a mechanism 
 
 
infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately 
documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”); 
Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(“The DMCA places the burden on the copyright owner to monitor the 
internet for potentially infringing sales.”). 
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
31. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (emphasis added). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
34. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (“The provisions in the bill balance the 
need for rapid response to potential infringement with the end-users 
legitimate interests in not having material removed without recourse.”). 
35. Section 512(g)(3) states: 
To be effective under this subsection, a counter notification must be 
a written communication provided to the service provider’s 
designated agent that includes substantially the following: 
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to have content that was removed via a takedown notice to be 
restored. When Congress enacted the DMCA, it explained that  
the counter notification  provision  was  “added  as  an  
amendment . . . to address the concerns of several members of the 
Committee that other provisions of this title established strong 
incentives for service providers to take down material, but 
insufficient protections for third parties whose material would be 
taken down.”36 In short, the procedure was designed to protect 
innocent users who post material on websites that could be subject 
to takedown notices, even though their material was non- 
infringing.37 However, the counter notification procedure is an 
insufficient protection for users because of the nature of the 
procedure itself in comparison with the need of OSPs to preserve 
safe harbor status. 
A service provider need only notify the user that his or her 
material was removed. To maintain safe harbor protection, an 
OSP must “take[] reasonable steps promptly to notify the [user] 
that it has removed or disabled access to the material.”38 Oddly, 
 
 
(A) A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber. 
(B) Identification of the material that has been removed or to 
which access has been disabled and the location at which the 
material appeared before it was removed or access to it was 
disabled. 
(C) A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has 
a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as 
a result of mistake or misidentification of the material to be 
removed or disabled. 
(D) The subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number, and 
a statement that the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction of 
Federal District Court for the judicial district in which the 
address is located, or if the subscriber’s address is outside of the 
United States, for any judicial district in which the service 
provider may be found, and that the subscriber will accept 
service of process from the person who provided notification 
under subsection (c)(1)(C) or an agent of such person. 
36. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 50. Notably, Congress described the counter- 
notification process as the “put back” procedure. Id. at 49–50 (“Subsection 
[(g)] provides immunity to service providers for taking down infringing 
material, and establishes a ‘put back’ procedure under which subscribers may 
contest a complaining party’s notification of infringement provided under 
subsection (c)(3).”). 
37. See id. at 50. 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A). Generally, to post or upload material to an 
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an OSP is not required, by the terms of the statute, to inform the 
user of the counter notification procedure that would allow the 
user to republish the material.39 This means that OSPs, such as 
YouTube, can simply remove the material from their websites 
without informing the user that he or she has the right to put  
back his or her material. 
Nevertheless, once the material is removed and the user 
learns about its removal, whether through loss of revenue or 
otherwise, the decision solely rests with the user as to whether 
sending a counter notice under § 512(g)(3) is appropriate.40 If the 
user sends a counter notice, the OSP is required to put back the 
removed or disabled material in “not less than 10, nor more than 
14, business days following receipt of the counter notice,” unless 
the copyright owner first files an injunction against the user in 
connection with the material posted.41 
The requirements for sending a counter notice are similar in 
some respects and different in others to the requirements for 
sending a takedown notice. For instance, both  require  a 
signature, identification of the material in question, a statement 
that the sender has a “good faith belief,” and a statement made 
“under penalty of perjury.”42 However, only the sender of a 
counter notice must “consent to the jurisdiction of [the] Federal 
District Court for the judicial district in which the [user] is 
located” and agree to “accept service of process from the person 
who provided [the takedown] notification.”43 
The information needed to send a counter notice deters users 
because “[t]o issue a counter-notice, a user must reveal her 




OSP’s website requires creating an account with that site. Usually, when a 
user creates an account, the OSP requires the user to provide his or her 
contact information, which likely includes a valid email that is confirmed by 
the OSP and possibly a telephone number. 
39. Loren, supra note 21, at 759; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A). 
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(A)–(D). 
41. Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
42. See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi), (g)(3)(A)–(D). 
43. Id. § 512(g)(3)(D). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(D) (requiring a 
consent to jurisdiction requirement before sending a counter notice) with 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)–(vi) (omitting a consent to jurisdiction requirement 
before sending a takedown notice). 
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copyright infringement.”44 Because the average internet user 
likely knows nothing about civil procedure, the “required contents 
for the counter-notice will cause many individuals to pause before 
sending one.”45 As a result, users “would rather forego having 
their material reposted than face a lawsuit.”46 
Indeed, a recent study shows that users rarely send counter 
notices.47 In 2014, Daniel Seng conducted an empirical analysis of 
takedown notices stored in the Chilling Effect’s project repository 
(now the Lumen database).48 The study showed that 67,571 
notices were sent in 2011, and 441,370 were sent in 2012.49  Out  
of those notices, the study found that only fifty-nine counter 
notices that related to a § 512(c) takedown notice were sent in 
2011, and similarly only eighty-two counter notices were sent in 
2012.50 In other words, counter notices made up less than one- 
tenth of one percent of all notices sent in 2011 and 2012.51 It is 
unclear why counter notices are rarely utilized, but some scholars 
have advanced several theories including lack of  user 
awareness,52 privacy concerns, submitting to intimidating legal 




44. Marc J. Randazza, Lenz v. Universal: A Call to Reform Section 512(f) 
of the DMCA and to Strengthen Fair Use, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 743, 
755 (2016). 
45. Loren, supra note 21, at 760. 
46. Id. 
47. See infra note 51; see also Urban et al., supra note 13, at 44. In the 
Urban study, the researchers interviewed twenty-nine OSPs and six major 
notice senders. Urban et al., supra note 13, at 26. Of the thirty-five 
respondents, only one “reported receiving more than a handful per year.” Id. 
at 44. 
48. See Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical 
Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369, 379–80 (2014). 
A vast majority of the takedown notices in the Chilling Effects repository  
were those received by Google and Twitter. Id. at 389. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 427–28. 
51. Counter notices made up approximately 0.087% of all notices sent in 
2011, and approximately 0.018% of all notices sent in 2012. See id. 
52. Loren, supra note 21, at 759. 
53. See Zoe Carpou, Note, Robots, Pirates, and the Rise of the Automated 
Takedown Regime: Using the DMCA to Fight Piracy and Protect End-Users, 39 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 551, 566–67 (2016); see also Randazza, supra note 44, at 
755; Seng, supra note 48, at 430. 
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2. Section 512(f) Claims 
The second tool Congress conferred on users to push back 
against improper takedowns is the § 512(f) misrepresentation 
claim.54 Section 512(f) provides users with a right of action  
against anyone who “knowingly” makes a misrepresentation in a 
takedown notice.55 Congress intended § 512(f) to “deter knowingly 
false allegations to service providers in recognition that such 
misrepresentations are detrimental to rights owners, service 
providers, and Internet users.”56 
Importantly, § 512(f) is the only means by which a user can 
push back against an improperly sent takedown notice in court.57 
However, except for a few clear-cut § 512(f) cases,58 courts have 
generally wrestled with how § 512(f) should be interpreted and 
applied because of the limited amount of case law surrounding 
 
54. Section 512(f) states: 
Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this 
section— 
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or 
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake 
or misidentification, 
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ 
fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or 
copyright owner’s authorized licensee, or by a service provider, 
who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the 
service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in 
removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed 
to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing 
to disable access to it. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012). 
55. Id. 
56. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 49 (1998); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill 
LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Accusations of alleged 
infringement have drastic consequences: A user could have content removed, 
or may have his access terminated entirely. If the content infringes, justice 
has been done. But if it does not, speech protected under the First 
Amendment could be removed.”). 
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 
58. See Curtis v. Shinsachi Pharm. Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1199 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014) (finding that sending a takedown notice based on a non-existent 
infringement is sufficient for § 512(f) liability to attach); Smith v. Summit 
Entm’t LLC, No. 3:11CV348, 2011 WL 2200599, at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 
2011) (finding a takedown notice issued on the basis of trademark 
infringement was sufficient evidence for plaintiff to proceed with § 512(f) 
claim). 
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such claims.59 Under current § 512(f) case law, the plaintiff-user 
must show that the sender had actual knowledge of the 
misrepresentation.60 But, actual knowledge may be inferred from 
the  sender’s  failure  to  form  a  good  faith  belief  as  required in 
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v) of the takedown statute.61 For example, if a 
copyright owner sends a takedown notice for the purpose of 
removing a competitor’s online material, the copyright owner 
failed to form a good faith belief.62 
In short, § 512(f) provides users with the means to fight back 
against overzealous copyright owners who force OSPs to remove 
non-infringing material by showing that the copyright owner 
knowingly misrepresented that the material was copyrighted.63 
II. THE GOOD FAITH BELIEF REQUIREMENT AND COMPUTERIZED 
METHODS 
A copyright owner’s failure to form a “good faith belief” before 
sending a takedown notice is sufficient to trigger § 512(f) 
liability.64 This Part examines the primary case law that has 
interpreted the “good faith belief” requirement in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) 
of the takedown statute. Given the vast amount of web-based 
copyright infringement uploaded daily,65 it is likely that the issue 
of whether a copyright owner can form a good faith belief through 





59. Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp. (Hotfile), No.  11-20427-CIV, 
2013 WL 6336286, at *46 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (“[T]he parties, like the 
Court, have grappled with several issues surrounding enforcement of Section 
512(f), which is not well understood.”); Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. 
Wilson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 678, 704 (D. Md. 2011) (“There is not a great deal of 
case law interpreting [section 512(f)].”). 
60. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz II), 815 F.3d 1145, 1154 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
61. Id. 
62. See Curtis, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1198–99. 
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012). 
64. See id. 
65. Ted Johnson, NBCU-Backed Study: Online Piracy Continues to Rise 
Dramatically, VARIETY (Sept. 17, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://variety.com/2013/ 
digital/news/piracy-continues-to-rise-dramatically-study-from-nbcu- 
concludes-1200614944/ [https://perma.cc/8JJX-XDK7]. 
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A. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America: Copyright Owners 
Are Held to a Subjective Good Faith Belief Standard 
In Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America,66 the operator of  
a website advertised that users could download “Full Length” 
movies.67 In response, the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA) sent several takedown notices to Rossi and his service 
provider.68 However, Rossi’s website in fact did not allow users to 
download videos.69 Rossi urged the Ninth Circuit that 
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v) should encompass an objective good faith belief 
standard.70 Specifically, Rossi argued that “if [the] MPAA had 
reasonably investigated the site by attempting to download 
movies, it would have been apparent that no movies could actually 
be downloaded from his website or related links.”71 In rejecting 
Rossi’s argument, the Ninth Circuit held that § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) 
encompasses a subjective good faith belief standard because 
“courts interpreting other federal statutes have traditionally 
interpreted ‘good faith’ to encompass a subjective standard.”72 
Interestingly, the Rossi court noted an argument raised by an 
amicus curiae regarding whether a copyright owner employing 
computerized methods to search for infringing material is 
sufficient to form a good faith belief.73 The court, however, did not 
address the argument because “the MPAA employ[ed] three to 
four employees who actually review[ed] the identified sites.”74 
Therefore, because there were employees who actually reviewed 
 
66. 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 
67. Id. at 1002. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1003. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1004–05 (citations omitted). Notably, Rossi overturned Online 
Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., in which the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California had held that § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) encompassed 
an objective reasonableness standard. See Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 
337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (applying objective standard 
against copyright owner in the context of a § 512(f) claim). 
73. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005 n.7 (“Amici Curiae Net–Coalition and 
Internet Commerce Coalition contend that computers conducting automated 
searches cannot form a belief consistent with the language of the DMCA, 
because they cannot distinguish between infringing content and content that 
merely contains words that suggest infringement.”). 
74. Id. 
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the sites, and, presumably, acted in good faith in identifying 
infringing material, the court implicitly found it was unnecessary 
to analyze whether using computerized methods to find and 
remove infringing material satisfied the good faith belief 
requirement. 
B. Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp.: Purely Computerized 
Takedowns and Bad Faith 
In Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp.,75 a group of large- 
scale copyright owners76 filed several infringement claims based 
on direct and secondary liability against Hotfile, a web-based 
company that provided online file storage services.77 In response, 
Hotfile filed a § 512(f) counterclaim against Warner Brothers 
(Warner).78 
The facts related to the § 512(f) counterclaim showed that 
Warner used a computer algorithm that had an error rate of less 
than one percent.79 Yet, the record indicated that Warner’s  
“efforts to police [infringement] were at times overzealous and 
overreaching.”80 For example, Warner issued takedown notices 
regarding an application it did not own, called “JDownloader.”81 
The court, in permitting Hotfile to proceed on its § 512(f) 
counterclaim, found “sufficient evidence in the record to suggest 
that Warner intentionally targeted files it knew it had no right to 
remove,”82 because Warner “acknowledged removing 
[JDownloader] for reasons unrelated to copyright infringement.”83 
Interestingly, before the Hotfile court reached its holding,  the 
 
 
75. No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286, at *14–15 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 
2013). 
76. The owners included Disney Enter., Inc., Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., Universal City Studios Prod.s LLLP, Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc., and Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. Id. at *1. 
77. Id. 
78. See id. 
79. Id. at *15. 
80. Id. at *16. 
81. Id. at *48. 
82. Id. 
83. Order Denying Summary Judgment on Hotfile Counterclaim at 97, 
Hotfile, No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) 
(emphasis added), https://www.eff.org/document/order-denying-summary- 
judgment-hotfile-counterclaim-ecf-534 [https://perma.cc/3W9B-V8Q2]. 
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court considered the complexities computerized methods 
potentially entail when analyzing a § 512(f) claim. For instance, 
Hotfile raised two arguments that the court did not explicitly 
address.84 Rather, after reviewing the relevant § 512(f) precedent, 
the court stated: 
[I]f Warner had some similar type of duty [to consider fair 
use], it might find itself vulnerable to suit because its pre- 
notice review was minimal and swift, consisting of 
mechanically reviewing the titles and superficial 
attributes of files. Moreover, even if its methodology were 
reliable, Warner was concerned with determining 
whether it owned the works rather than whether the use 
of the works infringed on its copyrights to support 
[sending a takedown notice].85 
The court further explained that “Warner’s reliance on 
technology to accomplish the task might prevent it from forming 
any belief at all.”86 
Moreover, although the opinion is highly redacted, portions of 
the opinion were unsealed in September 2014.87 The unsealed 
 
84. First, Hotfile argued that the “egregious” attributes of Warner’s 
system, “such as not relying on human review, failing to download mistaken 
files, and failing to examine file titles,” prevented it from acquiring subjective 
knowledge. Id. at 94. Second, the defendant argued  that  Warner’s 
knowledge of the system’s error rate could raise an inference of actual 
knowledge. Id at 95. 
85. Id. at 96. The Hotfile court, in ending its inquiry into computerized 
methods, stated: 
Ultimately, while these are engaging questions surrounding 
Warner’s knowledge; its responsibility to investigate; whether it had 
a good faith belief in infringement in each instance; and whose 
burden it is to show or refute what—all issues of first impression in 
this Circuit—there is sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that 
Warner intentionally targeted files it knew it had no right to remove. 
Hotfile, 2013 WL 6336286, at *48. 
86. Id. at *47. The Hotfile court, however, stated that it was “unaware   
of any decision to date that actually addressed the need for human review, 
and the statute does not specify how belief of infringement may be formed or 
what knowledge may be chargeable to the notifying entity.” 2013 WL 
6336286, at *48. 
87. Mitch Stoltz, EFF Wins Release of Warner Bros. Documents on Robo- 
Takedown System, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/eff-wins-release-warner-bros- 
documents [https://perma.cc/3QF8-M4LK]. 
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portions revealed that Warner “uses the common practice of 
having automated systems [] scan link sites and [] issue 
notifications of infringement to [storage] locker sites when 
infringing content is detected.”88 Furthermore,  Warner’s 
algorithm solely identified infringing material by “us[ing] 
keywords to search for content based on attributes such as the 
file’s title, genre, and year of release.”89 
The unsealed portions of Hotfile are important for two 
reasons. First, it was the first time any court substantially 
addressed a copyright owner’s use of computerized methods and 
how that may affect the owner’s ability to form a good faith belief. 
Second, it was also the first time a copyright owner’s computerized 
methods were revealed in connection with the takedown process. 
C. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.: Copyright Owners Are 
Required to Consider Fair Use Before Issuing a Takedown Notice 
Stephanie Lenz, a mother of two, posted a twenty-nine second 
video on YouTube, titled “Let’s Go Crazy’ #1.”90 The video showed 
her two young children dancing to the song Let’s Go Crazy by 
Prince.91 Universal Music Corporation (Universal), as Prince’s 
publishing administrator, was responsible for enforcing Prince’s 
copyrights.92 Universal sent a takedown notice that listed over 
200 videos, including Lenz’s video, to YouTube.93 Prior to sending 
that takedown notice, Universal used a criterion that did not 
explicitly consider fair use.94 Lenz responded by issuing a counter 
 
88. Order Denying Summary Judgment on Hotfile Counterclaim at 29, 
Hotfile, No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) 
(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal 








94. See id. According to Universal’s criteria, YouTube videos were to be 
evaluated as to “whether they ‘embodied a Prince composition’ by making 
‘significant use of . . . the composition, specifically if the song was 
recognizable, was in a significant portion of the video or was the focus of the 
video.’” Id. Furthermore, Universal’s “general guidelines” were to “review 
the video to ensure that the composition was the focus and if it was [a 
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notice under § 512(g)(3).95 Nonetheless, Universal protested the 
reinstatement of the video on grounds that Lenz’s counter notice 
was defective and that Lenz was never granted a license in the 
work.96 However, YouTube eventually reinstated the video after 
Lenz sent a second counter notice.97 
Lenz filed a § 512(f) misrepresentation claim against 
Universal in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California.98 In response, Universal filed a motion to 
dismiss.99 Universal argued that copyright owners cannot be 
required to evaluate fair use because fair use is an affirmative 
defense and, thus not “authorized by the copyright owner or by 
law” under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) of the takedown statute.100 Lenz 
countered that fair use is authorized by the law because “the fair 
use doctrine itself is an express component of copyright law.”101 
The court, in denying Universal’s motion, held that a copyright 
“owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the 
copyright” before sending a takedown notice because a “fair use is 
a lawful use of a copyright.”102 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that “fair use is ‘authorized 
by the law’ and a copyright holder must consider the existence of 
fair use before sending a takedown notification under § 512(c).”103 
In doing so, the court rejected Universal’s argument that fair use 
 
 
Universal employee] then notify YouTube that the video should be removed.” 
Id. 
95. Id. at 1150. 
96. See id. Universal never mentioned fair use during its protest. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 1154. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016). It is worth mentioning 
that before Lenz was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the case went through 
various pretrial judgments. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07–cv– 
03783–JF, 2013 WL 271673 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (denying motions for 
summary judgment); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No.C 07–3783 JF, 2010 
WL 702466 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) (granting plaintiff's motion for partial 
summary judgment on affirmative defenses); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 
No. C 07–3783 JF(RS), 2008 WL 4790669 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) (denying 
motion for interlocutory appeal). 
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is an affirmative defense in the takedown context.104 Rather, the 
court explained that, in the context of takedown notices, “fair use 
is uniquely situated in copyright law so as to be treated differently 
than traditional affirmative defenses.”105 However, the court 
tempered its holding by explaining that before a copyright owner 
sends a takedown notice, the owner “need only form a subjective 
good faith belief that a use is not authorized.”106 
Nevertheless, it is clear from Lenz II that a user can bring a 
§ 512(f) claim by alleging that a copyright owner did not consider 
fair use before issuing a takedown notice.107 Although the court 
was unclear as to what steps a copyright owner must take to 
sufficiently consider fair use,108 the Lenz II court stated that if a 
copyright owner’s fair use consideration amounts to ignorance or 
neglect, the owner is subject to § 512(f) liability.109 Furthermore,  
a copyright owner could also be liable if it merely pays lip service 
to the fair use consideration.110 
D. Lenz Amended 
Both Universal and Lenz petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a 
panel rehearing, and Lenz also petitioned for a rehearing en 
banc.111 The Ninth Circuit denied both parties’ petitions,112 but 
amended its original opinion.113 In the original opinion, the court 
had included several paragraphs that seemingly endorsed the use 
of computerized methods as a means of satisfying the good faith 
belief requirement.114 For example, the original opinion stated 
 
104. See id. at 1152–53. 
105. Id. at 1153. 
106. Id. (citing Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 
(9th Cir. 2004)). The Lenz II court also found that a jury must consider 
whether Universal’s failure to explicitly consider fair use before sending the 
takedown notice was “sufficient to form a subjective good faith belief about 
the video’s fair use or lack thereof.” 815 F.3d at 1154. 
107. See id. at 1154; see also Laura A. Possessky, Throwing the Baby Out 
with the Bathwater: Lenz v. Universal and the Future of DMCA Safe Harbor 
Takedown Notifications, 8 LANDSLIDE 10, 12 (2016). 
108. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d at 1154. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1148. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. (Lenz I), 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th 
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that “a copyright holder’s consideration of fair use need not be 
searching or intensive . . . . [T]he implementation of computer 
algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for 
processing a plethora of content while still meeting the DMCA’s 
requirements to somehow consider fair use.”115 However, the 
second, later opinion does not include this section, or the 
paragraphs that seemed to endorse the use of computerized 
methods to satisfy the good faith belief requirement.116 It is 
unclear why the court amended its opinion, but it is possible that 
at least one judge found that Lenz was not the appropriate case for 
delving into the validity of computerized methods given that, 
according to the facts, the removal of Lenz’s video was not the 
result of a computerized takedown.117 
Another possible reason for why the Ninth Circuit initially 
endorsed the use of computerized methods, despite that such 
methods were not at issue in Lenz, is found in the case it cited for 
a different proposition: Hotfile. In a parenthetical, the Ninth 
Circuit quoted a portion of Hotfile that referred to the fact that no 
court had ruled on the need for human review in the context of 
takedown notices.118 The Lenz I court’s citation to Hotfile  
suggests that the Ninth Circuit likely wanted to be the first court 
to explicitly state a position on computerized methods because 
most copyright owners are based in California. On the  other 
hand, the Ninth Circuit’s removal of that language could fairly be 
read as a warning to copyright owners that the use of 
computerized methods alone is insufficient to form a good faith 
 
Cir. 2015). 
115. Id. (citing Hotfile, No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286, at *47 (S.D. 
Fla. Sept. 20, 2013)). 
116. Compare Lenz II, 815 F.3d at 1145 (omitting any reference to 
computer algorithms), with Lenz I, 801 F.3d at 1135 (referring to computer 
algorithms). 
117. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d at 1149; Lenz I, 801 F.3d at 1135. It is worth 
noting that the Ninth Circuit amending an opinion on denial of an en banc 
rehearing is “a sure indication that some post-panel activity has taken place.” 
Stephen L. Wasby, “A Watchdog for the Good of the Order”: The Ninth 
Circuit’s En Banc Coordinator, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 91–92 (2011). 
118. Lenz I, 801 F.3d at 1135 (“The Court . . . is unaware of any decision 
to date that actually addressed the need for human review, and the statute 
does not specify how belief of infringement may be formed or what knowledge 
may be chargeable to the notifying entity.” (quoting Hotfile, 2013 WL 
6336286, at *47)). 
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belief.119 
Nevertheless, one thing that did not change between the 
Ninth Circuit’s original and amended Lenz opinion is that 
copyright owners must consider fair use before sending a 
takedown notice.120 However, Lenz failed to answer the question 
of whether a copyright owner can form a good faith belief through 
a computerized method. 
III. FAIR USE 
In light of the Lenz decision, copyright owners have a duty to 
consider fair use before sending takedown notices.121 Because fair 
use is a complex doctrine, it may be problematic to copyright 
owners who use computerized methods. 
A. What is a Fair Use? 
A fair use is not an infringement.122 Prior to the enactment of 
 
119. See Nicholas Thomas Delisa, Note, You(Tube), Me, and Content ID, 
81 BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1282 n.52 (2016) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
to remove that language “shows that the court is skeptical about the ability of 
computers to perform a good faith fair use analysis or complete a 
searching/intensive inquiry”). 
120. Lenz II, 815 F.3d at 1153 (“[A] copyright owner must consider the 
existence of fair use before sending a takedown notification under § 512(c).”); 
Lenz I, 801 F.3d at 1133. Lenz petitioned for writ of certiorari with the  United 
States Supreme Court to answer: 
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the affirmation 
of good faith belief that a given use of material use is not authorized 
‘by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,’ required under Section 
512(c) of the [DMCA], may be purely subjective and, therefore, that 
an unreasonable belief—such as a belief formed without 
consideration of the statutory fair use factors—will not subject the 
sender of a takedown notice to liability under Section 512(f) of the 
DMCA? 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lenz, 2016 WL 4376069, at *i (2016) (No. 16- 
217). Universal also petitioned for writ of certiorari with the Court to answer 
“[w]hether a plaintiff who alleges a statutory violation but no concrete or 
particularized injury has standing under Article III to seek a remedy of 
nominal damages?” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lenz, 2016 WL 4437629, 
at *i (2016) (No. 16-218). 
121. Lenz II, 815 F.3d at 1153. 
122.   17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is   
not an infringement of copyright.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (“Any individual may reproduce a 
copyrighted work for a ‘fair use.’”). 
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the Copyright Act of 1976,123 fair use law was an “exclusively 
judge-made doctrine.”124 The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the 
doctrine; however, ambiguities in the law remained. When 
determining whether a use qualifies as “fair,” courts are not 
guided by bright-line rules.125 Rather, the test for fair use is a 
case-by-case factual inquiry that requires the balancing and 
weighing of four factors against each other.126  Furthermore,  
while no one factor is dispositive, the Supreme Court has placed 
emphasis on the first factor with respect to the “transformative” 
purpose of the use.127 
The Court has also attached great weight to the third 
factor,128 which evaluates the “amount and substantiality” of the 
 
123. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
124. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). The 
United States Supreme Court’s fair use jurisprudence often refers  to 
passages from Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), as first recognizing the doctrine of fair use in 
1841. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.  v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985). 
125. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (“The task is not to be simplified with 
bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case- 
by-case analysis.”); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 (explaining that 
the examples set forth in the preamble to § 107 are not intended to be an 
exhaustive list). 
126. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Section 107 provides, in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair 
use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case 
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
127. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote 
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works.”). 
128. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (“[A] taking may not be excused 
merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work. As 
Judge Learned Hand cogently remarked, ‘no plagiarist can excuse the wrong 
by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.’” (quoting Sheldon v. 
 2018] COPYRIGHT TAKEDOWN NOTICES 249 
work copied “in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”129 
Recently, the Second Circuit stated that “[t]he clear implication of 
the third factor is that a finding of fair use is more likely when 
small amounts, or less important passages, are copied than when 
the copying is extensive, or encompasses the most important parts 
of the original.”130 In addition, each of the four factors must be 
“explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright.”131 
Fair use is a complex and constantly evolving component of 
copyright law. For instance, Justice Harry Blackmun once stated 
that “[t]he doctrine of fair use has been called, with some 
justification, the most troublesome in the whole law of 
copyright.”132 Similarly, in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., the 
Second Circuit found that Google Books, which allowed internet 
users to view a limited number of snippets from a catalog of 
millions of books that Google digitized without authorization from 
the copyright owners, was a fair use.133 As shown in Authors 
Guild, a fair use analysis is solely based on the factual nature of 
the copying at issue.134 Thus, the ever-changing nature of the 
internet coupled with the factual nuances involved in determining 





Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936))). In Harper & 
Row, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that publishing 300 words 
of former President Gerald Ford’s unpublished memoir was insubstantial 
because the 300 words were “essentially the heart of the book.” 471 U.S. at 
565 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 
1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
130. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(emphasis added) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–65). 
131. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. The Campbell Court declared  that  
“[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of 
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very 
purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” 510 U.S. at 
575 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
132. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 
104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
133. 804 F.3d at 229. 
134. See id. at 202. 
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B. The Implications of a Required Fair Use Consideration 
It is clear from Lenz that a copyright owner is held to a 
subjective standard for purposes of conducting the complex and 
pliable fair use analysis.135 However, the decision and its 
subsequent modification raise several questions that, so far, 
remain unanswered. How does a copyright owner “consider the 
existence” of a fair use? What does Lenz mean for the  vast  
amount of copyright owners who solely rely on computerized 
methods? Is it valid to form a subjective good faith belief through 
the use of computerized methods with human review or without 
human review, or both? What qualifies as a sufficient fair use 
analysis for purposes of forming a good faith belief? 
To “consider” fair use, one would assume that balancing and 
weighing the statutory fair use factors is necessary.136 Likewise, 
because fair use law is rooted in the common-law,137 a copyright 
owner considering fair uses recognized by courts138 likely satisfies 
the Lenz rule.139 While it is clear that computerized methods are 
able to identify when a user’s uploaded content matches a title, 
 
 
135. Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2016). 
136. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
137. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) 
(explaining that “fair use remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the 
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) 
(“The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of 
fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, 
especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad 
statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to 
it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a 
case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial 
doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.” 
(emphasis added)). 
138. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 (finding that a parody in the 
context of music was fair use); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 
202 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that digitizing and indexing millions of books that 
showed only a limited number of snippets for purposes of efficient searching 
was fair use); Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding 
that reproducing a copyrighted photograph on a blog used for criticism and 
commentary was fair use); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (finding that reformatting a work for the blind was fair use); White 
v. West Publishing Corp., No. 12 Civ. 1340(JSR), 2014 WL 3385480 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 3, 2014) (finding that reprinting publicly filed legal briefs in a database of 
legal resources was fair use). 
139. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d at 1153. 
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video, or audio track of a copyrighted work (i.e., metadata),140 it is 
less clear whether computerized methods can adequately perform 
a fair use analysis during its identification process.141 
Moreover, it is uncertain whether the use of computerized 
methods, alone, is sufficient to satisfy the required good faith fair 
use consideration because the Ninth Circuit removed all of the 
language that indicated computerized methods were an adequate 
means of satisfying the required good faith fair use 
consideration.142 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement  
of computerized methods in the original Lenz opinion, arguably, 
was a result of the Ninth Circuit originally finding Lenz to be the 
appropriate vehicle for such an endorsement of computerized 
methods and, subsequently, changing course.143 At a minimum, 
the validity of computerized methods in the notice-and-takedown 
process is unclear. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
For copyright owners, computerized methods are the optimal 
means of identifying internet-based copyright infringement since 
such methods are inexpensive to employ as compared to a human 
searching the vast terrain of the internet.144 Computerized 
methods also provide the most effective means for protecting the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners. However, a recent 
comprehensive study showed that computerized methods tend to 
have trouble distinguishing between infringing uses and non- 
infringing fair uses.145 Equally important, the amended Lenz 
 
140. See Order Denying Summary Judgment on Hotfile Counterclaim at 
29, 31, Hotfile, No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept.  20, 
2013), https://www.eff.org/document/order-denying-summary-judgment-hot 
file-counterclaim-ecf-534 [https://perma.cc/3W9B-V8Q2]. 
141. Urban et al., supra note 13, at 95 (“[F]air use analysis is famously 
fact-specific and nuanced, and generally considered ill-suited for automated 
decision-making.”); Rock supra note 12, at 704 (“The inherent nuances 
involved in identifying fair use, combined with the necessary limitations of an 
automated algorithm, suggest that it will be difficult, if not impossible, for a 
computer program to consistently and accurately identify fair use.”). 
142. Compare Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (omitting any 
reference to computer algorithms), with Lenz I, 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 
2015) (referring to algorithms). 
143. See infra Part II.D. 
144. Carpou, supra note 53, at 564–65. 
145. Urban et al., supra note 13, at 76. 
 252 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:229 
 
opinion removed all indications that computerized methods were a 
sufficient means of satisfying a good faith fair use 
consideration.146 
Thus, Lenz created uncertainty for all stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, the common thread that runs through Rossi,  
Hotfile, and Lenz is that each court, given the unique nature of the 
notice-and-takedown process in connection with computerized 
methods, considered how the use of computerized methods in the 
takedown process may affect how the subjective standard is 
applied and who should have to make certain showings.147 This 
thread matters because copyright owners must continue to use 
computerized methods in order to combat the ever-expanding 
nature of web-based copyright infringement. Therefore, it is  
highly likely that a court will be faced with addressing whether a 
subjective good faith belief standard is appropriate, and how a 
copyright owner’s computerized methods interplays with the duty 
to consider fair use. 
A. An Objective Standard Cuts Against the Purpose of the Notice- 
and-Takedown Scheme 
Before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lenz, scholars and 
commentators advanced several solutions that mostly centered on 
 
146. Compare Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (omitting any 
reference to computer algorithms), with Lenz I, 801 F.3d at 1135 (“[T]he 
implementation of computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith 
middle ground for processing a plethora of content while still meeting the 
DMCA’s requirements to somehow consider fair use.”). 
147. See supra Part II. For example, the Rossi court considered but did 
not address whether computerized methods may change how a subjective 
standard applies or whether additional burdens may be necessary because 
the MPAA in fact had its employees review the plaintiff’s website before 
sending the takedown notices. See Rossi v. Motion Pictures Ass’n of Am., 
Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1005 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004). In contrast, the Hotfile court 
suggested that Warner’s system, which only accounted for a file’s superficial 
attributes and not fair use, “might prevent [Warner] from forming any belief 
at all . . . .” See Hotfile, No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286, at *47 (S.D. 
Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). Interestingly, in Lenz, the original opinion seemingly 
endorsed the use of computerized methods, even though computerized 
methods were not at issue in the case. See Lenz I, 801 F.3d 1126, 1129, 1135–
36 (9th Cir. 2015). Finally, the Ninth Circuit amended its opinion in Lenz by 
removing all of the language that seemingly endorsed the use of computerized 
methods in the takedown process. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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the need for an objective standard based on, among other things, 
concerns for free speech148 and the lack of human review in the 
takedown process.149 
An objective good faith belief standard would require 
copyright owners to give individualized consideration before 
sending a takedown notice. While an objective standard would 
certainly deter copyright owners from sending improper takedown 
notices, an objective standard cuts against the purpose of § 512: 
“balanc[ing] the need for rapid response to potential infringement 
with the end-users legitimate interests in not having material 
removed without recourse.”150 In light of Lenz, an objective 
standard would necessarily imply that a copyright owner’s fair use 
analysis would be subject to the reasonableness of the 
consideration, and this consideration may hamper legitimate 
efforts to curb copyright infringement.151 Because there is no 
known mechanical fair use test, an objective good faith belief 
standard essentially requires a copyright owner to give 
 
148. See Jordan Koss, Note, Protecting Free Speech Unequivocal Fair 
Users: Rethinking our Interpretation of the § 512(f) Misrepresentation Clause, 
28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 167–68 (2010) (arguing that “an objective 
standard under § 512(f) best balances the interests of copyright owners and 
users”). The concerns for free speech are generally related to the use of 
takedown notices during political campaigns. For example, during the 2012 
United States presidential election, candidate Mitt Romney had a political 
advertisement removed that showed President Barack Obama singing “Let’s 
Stay Together” by Al Green because a copyright enforcement agency issued a 
takedown  notice. Amanda Terkel, Mitt Romney Ad Taken Down Over 
Copyright Claim, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/16/mitt-romney-ad_n_1677874.html; 
see  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIajeW6xPnI. Based on that and 
other similar examples, scholars have argued that the notice-and-takedown 
process allows the censoring of free speech because an OSP must wait at least 
ten days before complying with a counter notice in order to maintain safe 
harbor protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C) (2012); Wendy Seltzer, Free 
Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA 
on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 191 (2010). 
149. See Loren, supra note 21, at 783 (arguing for an objective standard); 
Benjamin Wilson, Comment, Notice, Takedown, and the Good-Faith 
Standard: How to Protect Internet Users from Bad-Faith Removal of Web 
Content, 29 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 613, 636 (2010) (arguing that copyright owners 
cannot form a good faith belief without conducting an initial review of the 
website). 
150. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998) (alteration in original) (emphasis 
added). 
151. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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individualized consideration to determine whether the potentially 
infringing material is fair use rather than using an efficient and 
cost effective computerized method. 
An objective good faith fair use consideration would impose an 
onerous burden on copyright owners. Because a fair use analysis 
is complex and ever-changing, holding a copyright owner to an 
objective standard necessitates the need for attorneys or 
employees to individually review every conceivable close call of 
fair use. When Rossi was decided in 2004, the internet was 
starting its transition from dial-up to broadband.152 At that point, 
the MPAA had “three to four employees” that reviewed the 
websites before issuing takedown notices153 most likely due to the 
internet being a smaller terrain. Currently, the internet is now a 
different place, in which a plethora of potentially infringing 
material can be uploaded to a website in a matter of minutes.154 
As a result, an objective standard would require a copyright owner 
to give individualized consideration to each potential infringing 
use before sending a takedown notice. Thus, an individualized 
consideration would cost copyright owners a substantial amount 
in lost revenue due to the massive amount of web-based copyright 
infringement coupled with the inefficient nature of a human 
removing web-based infringement.155 
For example, in March 2016, the Takedown Project released a 
comprehensive study on takedown notices and collected a data set 
of 108.3 million takedown requests from the Lumen database 
between May 1, 2013 and October 31, 2013.156 The study found 
 
152. Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Home Broadband 2013, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home- 
broadband-2013/ [https://perma.cc/DP52-B42T]. 
153. Rossi v. Motion Pictures Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1005 n.7 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
154. Fiber Optic Internet Speed: How fast is Fiber Optic Internet?, 
FASTMETRICS, https://www.fastmetrics.com/how-fast-is-fiber-optic-internet. 
php. (last visited Sept. 16, 2017). 
155. See Ira Steven Nathenson, Looking for Fair Use in the DMCA’s  
Safety Dance, 3 AKRON INTEL. PROP. J. 121, 128 (2009) (explaining that “fair 
use is highly indeterminate, and in many cases a lawyer who considers fair 
use might reasonably conclude that the law is sufficiently unclear that a take-
down [notice] can be sent in good-faith” (alteration in original)). 
156. Urban et al., supra note 13, at 76. According to the study, “all 
takedown requests” in the dataset “appeared to be automated.” Id. at 2. The 
researchers noted that “[i]t is theoretically possible that these notices were 
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that roughly one-third (approximately 28.4%) of those requests 
had “characteristics that raised clear questions about their 
validity.”157 More importantly, the study found that “[a]bout one 
in fifteen (6.6%) of requests were flagged with characteristics that 
weigh[ed] favorably toward fair use.”158 In other words, 
approximately 7.9 million potential fair uses were removed from 
the internet by the takedown process. To put  this  into 
perspective, only one known § 512(f) case could be traced to that 
same time period.159 
A copyright owner’s duty to consider fair use eliminates the 
possibility of an objective standard. Due to the needs of copyright 
owners to remove millions of potentially infringing materials on a 
daily basis, an individualized consideration of every potential web- 
based infringement would impede a copyright owner’s ability to 
deal efficiently with infringement given the pliable nature of a fair 
use analysis in connection with the internet’s ever-changing 
nature.160 Moreover, courts interpreting the takedown and 
misrepresentation statutes have shown a strong reluctance to 
entertaining either section as encompassing an objective 
standard.161 The Rossi court and, twelve years later, the Lenz 
court held that, in ruling on a § 512(f) claim, “the good faith belief 
requirement in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) encompasses a subjective, rather 
than objective, standard.”162 
On the other hand, proponents would argue that an objective 
standard is needed to put teeth into § 512.163 Currently, an 
 
not generated and sent automatically, but this is highly unlikely” because 
automation is “the standard industry practice[] . . . .” Id. at 83 n.230. 
157. Id. at 88. 
158. Id. at 95. 
159. See Flynn v. Siren-BookStrand, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-3160, 2013 WL 
5315959 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2013). 
160. See Nathenson, supra note 155, at 128. 
161. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
argument that § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) encompasses an objective reasonableness 
standard); Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc, 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a sender of a takedown notice  
should have to reasonably investigate the website prior to issuing a takedown 
notice). 
162. Lenz II, 815 F.3d at 1153–1154 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004. 
163. See Loren, supra note 21, at 782 (arguing that § 512(c)(3)(A)(v)  
should encompass an objective standard). 
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average of two § 512(f) cases have been brought each year while 
the amount of takedown notices has steadily increased.164 In 
addition, the Urban study showed that millions of potential fair 
uses are removed by computerized  methods.165  Likewise, 
research also indicates that users rarely send counter notices.166 
Moreover, an objective standard would require an individualized 
review process before sending a takedown notice due to a higher 
likelihood of § 512(f) liability.167 As a result, proponents would 
argue that an objective standard is necessary to fix the inadequate 
user push back tools Congress provided in the DMCA. 
But, individualized consideration does not fit the balance 
Congress intended. Congress merely intended a balance between 
“the need for rapid response to potential infringement [and] the 
end-users legitimate interests in not having material removed 
without recourse.”168 Although ineffective, users have recourse in 
the counter notification process and the ability to bring § 512(f) 
claims.169 Furthermore, while an objective standard would 
increase protections for users, Congress expressly intended the 
takedown process as a means for copyright owners to efficiently 
remove web-based infringement.170 Therefore, an objective 
standard would distort the balance Congress intended because it 
would go beyond recourse and into a legal scheme that Congress 
did not intend through the terms of § 512.171 
B. Lenz: The Appropriate Baseline for Protecting Fair Uses and 
Copyright Owners 
While some interest groups contend that Lenz did not go far 
enough in setting a more rigorous standard on copyright 
 
 
164. Id. at 759–60, 782; Seng, supra note 48, at 389. 
165. Urban et. al., supra note 13, at 95–97. 
166. See supra note 51. 
167. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012). 
168. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998) (emphasis added). Recourse is the 
“[e]nforcement of, or a method for enforcing, a right.” Recourse, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1466 (10th ed. 2014). 
169. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 50 (1998). 
170. Id. at 45 (“Th[e] ‘notice and takedown’ procedure is a formalization 
and refinement of a cooperative process that has been employed to deal 
efficiently with network-based copyright infringement.”). 
171. See id. at 21. 
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owners,172 Lenz may deter some copyright owners from sending 
improper takedown notices. The Ninth Circuit amended its 
opinion and removed all language that appeared to endorse the 
use of computerized methods as a sufficient means of satisfying 
the good faith fair use consideration.173 Thus, users may be 
protected from the imposed duty on copyright owners to consider 
fair use, and that computerized methods may not be enough to 
satisfy a good faith fair use consideration. 
Moreover, Lenz provides an appropriate baseline for 
protecting fair uses while not imposing an onerous burden on a 
copyright owner’s ability to enforce his or her exclusive rights.   
For users, copyright owners must actually consider fair use and 
will be held liable if the owner’s fair use consideration amounts to 
ignorance, neglect, or mere lip service.174 This is a significant 
improvement from how some cases were resolved pre-Lenz. For 
instance, in one pre-Lenz case, the United States District Court  
for the District of Colorado found that a copyright owner formed a 
sufficient good faith belief based on a mere showing of its 
attorney’s conclusory statement.175 Post-Lenz, such a conclusory 
statement would not be sufficient to satisfy that standard. Given 
the nature of the discovery process, copyright owners no longer 
can simply form a good faith belief with a mere conclusory 
statement. 
Alternatively, copyright owners believe that Lenz imposes an 
onerous burden. After Lenz, Universal sought review from the 
United States Supreme Court.176 The Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA)177 made the following arguments  
in support of Universal’s petition for writ of certiorari.178 First, 
 
172. See Corynne McSherry, Dancing Baby Trial Back On? Another Mixed 
Ruling in Lenz v. Universal, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2016), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/dancing-baby-trial-back-another- 
mixed-ruling-lenz-v-universal [https://perma.cc/MVJ8-VUBM]. 
173. See Delisa, supra note 119, at 1282 n.52. 
174. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2016). 
175. See Dudnikov v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017–18 (D. 
Colo. 2005). 
176. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 
2016) (No. 16-218), 2016 WL 4437629, at *1. 
177. The RIAA placed thirteenth among the senders of takedown notices 
in the Seng study. Seng, supra note 48, at 392. 
178. Universal’s Article III standing argument is beyond the scope of this 
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RIAA argued that copyright owners “cannot easily engage in the 
time-consuming, indeterminate exercise of evaluating fair use 
before sending a takedown notice.”179 Second, it argued that 
“considering whether every instance of unauthorized use might be 
excused by the affirmative defense of fair use would also thwart 
Congress’s goal of providing copyright owners with a rapid 
response to potential infringement.”180 
However, these arguments are exaggerated. Lenz did not 
place an onerous burden on copyright owners. While a copyright 
owner cannot “easily” engage in a fair use determination, the 
Ninth Circuit made clear to copyright owners that it intends to be 
deferential to whatever results form a copyright owner’s fair use 
analysis.181 The Lenz court explicitly stated that if “a copyright 
holder forms a subjective good faith belief [that] the allegedly 
infringing material does not constitute fair use, we are in no 
position to dispute the copyright holder’s belief even if we would 
have reached the opposite conclusion.”182 Additionally, given that 
the threshold for a bad faith fair use consideration is predicated  
on a copyright owner’s ignorance, neglect, or mere lip service, 
there is a strong indication that the Ninth Circuit intended to be 
highly deferential to the copyright owner who makes an actual 
effort to consider fair use, so long as that effort is more than a 
facade.183 Thus, the required good faith fair use consideration 
amounts to no more than a small check on a copyright owners 
otherwise uncontrolled ability to remove any unauthorized uses of 
its copyrighted material. 
Additionally, the means exist for copyright owners to, at a 
minimum, separate blatantly infringing unauthorized uses from 
close call fair uses. The model example for such technology is 
found in YouTube’s Content ID program.184 In short, YouTube’s 
 
comment. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 
2016) (No. 16-218), 2016 WL 4437629, at *11–12. 
179. Brief for Recording Industry Ass’n of Am. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 25, Lenz II, 815 F. 3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 16- 
218), 2016 WL 4938268 (emphasis omitted). 
180. Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
105-190, at 21 (1998)). 
181. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2016). 
182. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
183. See id. 
184. See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/ 
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Content ID is a system where a copyright owner, who satisfies 
YouTube’s criteria, uploads copies of his or her copyrighted 
material through audio or visual files to YouTube’s Content ID 
database.185 YouTube then stores that content and scans any 
video uploaded by users against it.186 More importantly, the 
Content ID system identifies audio matches, video matches, 
partial matches, and other matches, even when the user’s 
uploaded video quality is worse than the copyright owner’s video 
file.187 If the Content ID flags a sufficient match between the 
uploaded video and the content in the database, YouTube notifies 
the copyright owner.188 The copyright owner, then, has the option 
to (a) mute the video’s audio, (b) block the whole video, (c) make 
money off the video by running advertisements in the video, or (d) 
track the video’s viewership statistics.189 
Although YouTube is an OSP, its Content ID program clearly 
illustrates that such methods exist to identify blatant matches  
and partial matches.190 Thus, in practice, a copyright owner need 
only consider fair use when its computerized method identifies an 
unauthorized use that is not a blatant infringement because 
sending a takedown notice based on what the copyright owner 
believes is a blatant infringement likely satisfies the Lenz 
threshold of ignorance, neglect, or mere lip service. 
 
youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/5MZ7-C5VX] (last visited 






190. This Comment assumes that computerized methods are able to 
separate or “sort” between blatant infringements and borderline fair uses. 
See, e.g., Kaplan Declaration in Support of Warner’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Hotfile’s Counterclaim at 5, Hotfile, (No. 11-20427), 2013 WL 
6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.eff.org/document/kaplan- 
declaration-support-warners-motion-summary-judgment-hotfiles- 
counterclaim-ecf-308-1 [https://perma.cc/R9LM-YCJR] (describing that 
Warner’s computerized method is “a system that, by design, favors excluding 
files rather than potentially misidentifying files”); see generally Brief for 
Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. as Amicie Curiae Supporting Appellant, Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (2016) (No. 13-16107), 2013 WL 
5798884, at *3 (“In issuing takedown notices, copyright owners, including the 
MPAA and its members, are incentivized to focus on blatantly infringing 
content and to steer clear of fair use.”). 
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C. The Practical Effects of Lenz Weigh in Favor of Copyright 
Owners 
While Lenz provides the appropriate baseline for meeting the 
goals of the notice-and-takedown scheme, copyright owners are 
likely to continue the common practice of sending massive 
amounts of takedown notices through computerized methods 
because the risk of § 512(f) liability is outweighed by the potential 
for lost revenue from infringement.191 Moreover, a computerized 
takedown is 2.5 times more likely to sweep up infringing uses  
than non-infringing uses.192 On the other hand, Stephanie Lenz- 
type situations will likely be more prevalent as fair use law 
continues to evolve and the internet continues to expand. 
However, given the lack of user pushback,193 the status quo is 
likely to remain even when a fair user has her content removed. 
Due to these practical effects, the Lenz baseline merely tipped the 
balance slightly toward the side of users while still 
disproportionately favoring copyright owners. Accordingly, 
additional safeguards must be in place to protect fair users from 
improper takedown notices while also accounting for the reality 
that computerized methods are the standard means used to 
combat internet-based copyright infringement. Only then can the 
notice-and-takedown process fit the balance that Congress 
intended. 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
A. Copyright Owners Should Have to Show How Fair Use was 
Considered 
To achieve a proportional balance, a copyright owner should 
have to show, in response to a § 512(f) claim, that the methods 
used are able to consider the statutory fair use factors,194 or fair 
 
191. See Possessky, supra note 107, at 11. 
192. For example, the Urban study showed that nearly a third (28.4%) of 
takedown requests were questionable based on the face of the takedown 
notice. See Urban et al., supra note 13, at 88. Within that dataset, about one 
in fifteen requests (6.6%) raised questions about potential fair uses. Id. at 95. 
The bottom line is that computerized takedowns are 2.5 times as likely to 
sweep up an infringement than not. See id. at 88. 
193. See Seng, supra note 48, at 427–28. 
194. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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uses recognized by the courts.195 The  notice-and-takedown 
process is akin to an ex parte proceeding, such as a prejudgment 
attachment of property or prejudgment writ of garnishment. Both 
processes involve one party who, by virtue of a statute, is 
potentially permitted to remove ones’ property or online material 
so long as the statutory grounds are satisfied.196 However, unlike 
a takedown notice, which is briefly reviewed by an OSP, an ex 
parte petition is reviewed by an impartial decision-maker, usually 
a judge.197 Because the only time a takedown notice’s validity 
receives judicial review is in response to a § 512(f) claim, a similar 
burden—showing the statutory grounds, including an 
encompassed good faith fair use consideration, for issuing the 
takedown notice—should be placed on the copyright owner. 
As previously mentioned, the counter notification process is 
virtually never used because, among other things, users are likely 
unaware that it exists or are unwilling to submit to intimidating 
legal language.198 In addition, § 512(f) claims are rarely filed 
because the average internet user cannot afford an attorney.199 
 
195. See supra note 138. 
196. Usually, the terms of the relevant statute place the burden on the 
party seeking the attachment. See 28 U.S.C. § 3101(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012) 
(requiring the United States to show the statutory grounds in ex parte debt 
collection proceedings); COLO. R. CIV. P. 102(c) (West, Westlaw current with 
amendments received through July 15, 2017) (requiring the party seeking 
attachment to show the statutory grounds before a court will issue a writ of 
attachment in an ex parte proceeding). Although neither § 512(c) nor § 512(f) 
expressly place the burden on the party seeking a takedown notice, the 
burden should be encompassed in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) because the notice-and- 
takedown process is a unique statutory scheme in which First Amendment 
protections may be at stake and the due process provisions provided by 
Congress have been inadequate. In addition, the United States Supreme 
Court has previously invalidated a statute that allowed for the removal of 
property based on conclusory allegations. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 
1, 13–15 (1991) (holding that Connecticut’s prejudgment statute, which 
permitted a writ of attachment to issue based on a plaintiff’s conclusory 
allegations that there was probable cause to believe his claim was valid, 
violated the procedural component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
197. See Nathenson, supra note 155, at 145 (discussing how takedown 
notices are essentially “de facto ex parte seizures” because “few users write 
counter-notifications”). 
198. See Loren, supra note 21, at 760. 
199. For example, Stephanie Lenz brought her § 512(f) claim only after 
she obtained pro bono counsel. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 
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However, unlike an objective standard, placing the burden on 
copyright owners to show how they considered fair use weighs in 
favor of judicial economy because courts will be able to weed out 
§ 512(f) claims against owners who actually considered fair use. 
Finally, placing the burden on copyright owners is in line with the 
balance Congress intended because the showing would be minimal 
since the owner’s fair use consideration need only go beyond 
ignorance, neglect, or mere lip service. Thus, placing the burden 
on copyright owners would provide a significant improvement over 
the current procedure governing § 512(f) claims and would not 
hinder a copyright owners’ ability to efficiently remove blatant 
infringements. 
B. Courts Should Allow Copyright Owners to Form a Good Faith 
Belief Through Computerized Methods that are Comparable to 
YouTube’s Content ID 
While a court has never expressly ruled on the validity of a 
purely computerized takedown, courts should allow copyright 
owners, with computerized methods comparable to YouTube’s 
Content ID, to form a good faith belief solely through the use of 
computerized methods, so long as those methods accurately 
consider the statutory fair use factors200 or fair uses recognized by 
the courts.201 This recommendation could apply in two different 
situations.202 First, when a user uploads copyrighted material 
that is, in fact, a blatant infringement and the computerized 
method flags it as such. In that instance, the copyright owner 
should be found to have formed a good faith belief because blatant 
infringements are ordinarily not fair uses.203 Second, when the 
computerized method flags a user’s posted content as a blatant 
infringement, but that material could qualify as a fair use. In 
 
2016). 
200. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
201. See supra note 138. 
202. For purposes of this Comment, the following illustrations assume a 
user brought a § 512(f) misrepresentation claim against the copyright owner. 
Also, it is worth repeating that these scenarios only apply to  copyright 
owners with computerized methods comparable to YouTube’s Content ID. 
203. To be clear, this situation applies when a user uploads material as 
opposed to when an OSP, such as Google, digitizes millions of books that only 
show a limited number of snippets based on a user’s search terms. See 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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that instance, the copyright owner only forms a good faith belief if 
the method considered the statutory fair uses factors204 or fair 
uses recognized by courts.205 In other words, a copyright owner, 
who solely relies on a computerized method to flag infringing 
material, forms a good faith belief only if the owner demonstrates 
that its algorithm weighed the fair use factors before the  
takedown notice was sent. 
This recommendation provides a rational middle ground for 
copyright owners and users. Holding copyright owners  
accountable for using the most accurate and reliable technology 
when making a fair use determination increases protection for 
users because fair uses are less likely to be removed.  
Furthermore, unlike an objective standard, permitting copyright 
owners to form a good faith belief through computerized methods 
fits within the balance Congress intended because copyright 
owners need those methods in order to rapidly respond to  
potential infringement.206 
CONCLUSION 
Congress designed § 512 of the DMCA to balance the  
exclusive rights of copyright owners with the legitimate interests 
of users to not have material removed without recourse.207 Prior 
to Lenz, the scales tipped significantly in favor of copyright 
owners. Lenz provides the opportunity to return the scales to a 
proportional balance because copyright owners now have a legal 
duty to consider fair use before sending a takedown notice.208 
However, large-scale copyright owners have a significant interest 
in combating web-based infringement and will not be easily 
deterred because the risk of § 512(f) liability is substantially 
outweighed by the potential for lost revenue from infringement.209 
 
 
204. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
205. See supra note 138. 
206. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998) (“[B]alanc[ing] the need for 
rapid response to potential infringement with the end-users legitimate 
interests in not having material removed without recourse.”). 
207. Id. 
208. See Lenz II, 815 F.3d 1145, 1153  (9th  Cir.  2016)  (“[A]  copyright 
holder must consider the existence of fair use before sending a takedown 
notification under § 512(c).”). 
209. See supra Part IV.C. 
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As a result, Lenz does not cure the inherent defects in § 512(c) 
that leave users at the mercy of copyright owners or, for that 
matter, anyone. In a matter of minutes, any person or automated 
computer system can send a takedown notice to an OSP. The  
OSP, serving as a rubber stamp, has absolutely no reason but to 
remove a user’s generated content. Although users technically 
have recourse to an improperly sent takedown notice, those 
counter-weights are essentially useless to the average internet 
user. 
The ever-changing nature of the internet will result in more 
Stephanie Lenz-type situations. Although Lenz is a step in the 
right direction, the court’s vagueness and oversimplification 
regarding a required good faith fair use consideration only 
complicates matters for all stakeholders. The most appropriate 
solution to building on the Lenz baseline is two-fold: (1) in 
response to a § 512(f) claim, copyright owners should have the 
burden to show that the statutory grounds, including an 
encompassed good faith fair use consideration, were satisfied 
before it issued the takedown notice; and, (2) copyright owners, 
who employ methods comparable to YouTube’s Content ID, should 
be allowed to form a good faith belief through the use of a 
computerized method, so long as that method considers fair use. 
